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THE NEED FOR FEDERAL PRODUCT LIABILITY AND
TOXIC TORT LEGISLATION: A CURRENT
ASSESSMENT*
VICTOR E.. SCHWARTZ]
THOMAS C. MEANStt
I. INTRODUCTION
S INCE the founding of the Nation, tort law has traditionally been
the "province of the states." Only when a serious social problem
has been suffused with a national interest and not been susceptible to
resolution by the states have federal incursions into this state law do-
main been permitted.' There are, however, a number of proposals
currently pending before Congress that call for federal legislative ini-
tiatives in the field of tort law. These proposals are particularly sur-
prising in light of the general trend of federal retrenchment and the
new federalist regulatory deferral to the states.2 Most of these propos-
* The authors note that the views expressed in this article are not necessarily
those of their clients and are offered for the purpose of furthering public discussion of
the issues.
t Partner, Crowell & Moring, Washington, D.C. A.B. Boston University, 1962;
J.D. Columbia University, 1965. Adjunct Professor of Law, American University.
Co-Author, PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, (7th
ed. 1982); Author, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (1974 & Supp. 1981). Mr. Schwartz
chaired the Federal Interagency Task Force on Product Liability and was the princi-
pal drafter of the Uniform Product Liability Act.
tt Associate, Crowell & Moring, Washington, D.C. A.B. Dartmouth College,
1969; M.P.A., University of Colorado, 1975; J.D. The George Washington University
School of Law, 1978.
1. See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2083 (1982) (uni-
form safety standards for consumer products necessary to minimize conflicting state
and local regulations which were inadequate and burdensome to manufacturers);
Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-
950 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (facilitating compensation for persons engaged in mari-
time employment upon the "navigable waters" of the United States); Price-Anderson
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2210-2222 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (government indemnification
and liability limitation imposed in the context of licensing provisions for the nuclear
industry for the purpose of encouraging the growth of the industry by protecting
against unlimited liability in the event of a catastrophic nuclear accident); Federal
Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976) (facilitating the compensation of
occupational injuries suffered by railroad employees engaged in interstate or foreign
commerce). For a more detailed analysis of these and other federal statutes, see
Trauberman, Compensating /ictims of Toxic Substances Pollution. An Analysis of Existng
Federal Statutes, 5 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1981).
2. See New Federalism, 14 NAT'L J. 356, (Feb. 27, 1982). "New Federalism" rep-
resents President Reagan's program for overhauling the way the nation provides
public services and putting an end to decades of concentrating power in Washington.
Id In theory, the plan would simplify government at all levels by consolidating re-
(1088)
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als may be grouped into two rough classes, those providing for 1) fed-
eral product liability tort reform; or 2) federal compensation systems
for "toxic torts," that is, injuries caused by toxic substances.3
As explained below, these proposals, despite their common prod-
uct liability tort connection, are responsive to very different public
problems. Furthermore, the case for federal legislation is of a very
different nature as between the two classes of proposals. As a general
matter, federal product liability tort reform is necessary and appro-
priate. The toxic tort problem, on the other hand, is so multi-dimen-
sional that it is impossible to appraise proposals for federal legislation
on a blanket basis. Instead, we suggest below an analytic framework
for determining which aspects of the toxic tort problem are appropri-
ate for federal treatment. We conclude that at least one certain type
of toxic tort appears not only ripe for federal legislative intervention
but also may well require it. However, we believe that a need for
federal legislation addressing other toxic tort modalities has not been
established.
II. THE NEED FOR FEDERAL PRODUCT LIABILITY TORT REFORM
Several bills introduced in recent sessions of Congress would es-
tablish uniform federal standards of product liability law throughout
the United States.4 These bills have differed in their scope, 5 in the
sponsibility for operating programs. Id. The executive branch's desire to shift the
locus of power from Washington to the states diminishes the likelihood of imminent
broad-sweeping federal toxic torts legislation.
For a discussion of the relationship between New Federalism and federal prod-
ucts liability legislation, see generally, Florio, Product Liability, Insurance, and the New
Federalism, 2 J. PRODUCTS L. 1 (1983).
3. "Toxic substances" have been defined by statute to include those substances
whose "manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce, use, or disposal . . .
presents or will present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or environ-
ment. . . ." Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 2604(f)(3)(B) (1976
& Supp. V 1981).
4. S. 44, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S283 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1983); S.
2631, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. S6846 (daily ed. June 16, 1982); H.R.
5261, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. E5924 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1981); H.R.
5214, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H9529 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 1981); H.R.
1675, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 1572 (1979); H.R. 7000, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess., 126 CONG. REC. 7428 (1980). See Hollenshead, Historical Perspective on Product
Liability Reform, 1 J. PRODUCTS L. 75, 97-98 (1982); Note, Proposed Federal Products
Liability LTgislation-A Summary and Analysis, 1 J. PRODUCTS L. 103 (1982).
5. For an illustration of the major differences in the scope of the various product
liability reform bills, compare S. 44, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S283
(daily ed. Jan. 26, 1983) with H.R. 5261, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC.
E5924 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1981). S. 44, for example, prohibits the offensive use of
nonmutual collateral estoppel, makes inadmissable evidence of subsequent remedial
measures even in strict liability, and provides a procedure for the assessment of puni-
tive damages. See S. 44, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S283 (daily ed. Jan.
1982-83] 1089
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particular standards they would create, 6 and in their mechanisms for
implementation. 7 Yet, they spring from a common determination
that uniform rules of product liability law have become indispensable
to interstate commerce and that state action cannot provide the nec-
essary uniformity. As will become apparent, both the underlying
problem associated with product liability law, and the reason federal
legislation is necessary to solve it, are of a wholly different nature than
the problems surrounding the toxic tort situation.
A. The Product Liabi'ly Problem
Product liability law is the set of rules governing a product
seller's8 legal responsibility for harms caused by his products. 9 These
26, 1983). H.R. 5261 does not address any of these issues. See H.R. 5261, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. E5924 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1981).
6. S. 44, for example, would prohibit offensive use of nonmutual collateral es-
toppel. S. 44, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(c)(l)-(2), 129 CONG. REC. S284 (daily ed. Jan.
26, 1983). In contrast, H.R. 5214 precludes both offensive and defensive uses of non-
mutual collateral estoppel. H.R. 5214, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(e), 127 CONG. REC.
H 9529 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 1981). Furthermore, H.R. 5214 would limit punitive dam-
ages to twice the amount of actual damages or $1 million, whichever is less, with
further limitations based on a defendant's cumulative exposure to punitive damages.
Id § 11(d). S. 44, however, does not limit the amount of punitive damages which
may be assessed, but provides that punitive damages must be supported by "clear
and convincing" evidence. S. 44 § 13. It also provides that the court, rather than the
jury, is to determine the amount to be awarded. Id Furthermore, it requires the
court to consider a defendant's past or potential cumulative exposure, and permits a
defendant to introduce evidence of post-manufacturing improvements as a defense to
liability for punitive damages. Id See Note, supra note 4, at 106-29.
7. S. 44, for example, is self-executing; it provides that it "supercedes any state
law regarding matters governed by this Act." S. 44, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(c), 129
CONG. REC. S284 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1983). In contrast, H.R. 5261 does not necessar-
ily preempt state laws. H.R. 5261, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. E5924
(daily ed. Dec. 16, 1981). Rather, it would permit states to adopt their own product
liability laws, provided these laws conform to the bill's basic standards. Conformity
would be determined by the Standards for Products Liability Tort Law Review
Panel of the Department of Commerce, a panel whose establishment the bill autho-
rizes. Id §§ 101, 201. Only if a state's law were found not to conform would it be
preempted and an alternative federal plan then put into effect in that state. Id
§§ 202-204.
8. A "product seller" is anyone in the chain of commercial distribution of a
product, from the manufacturer to the lessor of a product. See U.S. DEPT. OF COM-
MERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY: FINAL REPORT I-I
(1977) (hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT]; Leete, Products Liabz'ity for
Nonmanufacturer Product Sellers.- Is It Tine To Draw The Line?, 17 FORUM 1250, 1250-51
(1982).
9. See W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TORTS 737 (7th ed. 1982). See also W. KEETON, D. OWEN & J. MONTGOMERY,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY: CASES AND MATERIALS 18 (1980). Product lia-
bility law governs the private litigation of product accidents. W. KEETON, D. OWEN
& J. MONTGOMERY, supra at 18. In a typical product liability case, a plaintiff injured
while using a product, brings an action for damages against the manufacturer or the
retailer of the product. Id. at 19.
1090 [Vol. 28: p. 1088
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rules are established almost exclusively by state judges in cases arising
out of an accident which has already occurred. As a result, these rules
not only vary widely from state to state but are also applied retroac-
tively, making the law unpredictable even within a single state. 10
Although this characterization applies equally to the law of
property, contract, and other branches of the common law, it poses a
unique problem in the field of product liability law. Because product
liability law is a hybrid of tort and contract law principles, I it has
been an area of law which is exceedingly difficult conceptually, and,
therefore, hard for courts to apply.12 Consequently, when a manufac-
turer or consumer attempts to determine how a court will rule in ap-
plying product liability law to the facts of a case before it,"3 it is faced
with incomparably low levels of predictability. Furthermore, due to
its relatively recent doctrinal emergence, product liability law wears
its competing policy considerations on its substantive sleeve, without
their firm embodiment in an integrated body of long-established rules
and venerable precedents to guide case dispositions along more con-
sistent and gradualist paths.' 4 Thus, product liability decisions on
similar facts may tend to vary widely from court to court and state to
state as different judicial philosophies are brought to bear in making
what are essentially case-by-case social policy judgments.' 5
Finally, the common law approach to lawmaking (state by state
and retroactive) has created a particularly intolerable problem with
regard to product liability because products are manufactured, sold,
used, and insured on a national basis. 16 Manufacturers face the im-
10. S. REP. No. 670, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1982) (reporting S. 2631) [hereinaf-
ter cited as SENATE REPORT].
11. W. KEETON, D. OWEN & J. MONTGOMERY, supra note 9, at 18. See also W.
PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, at 743 (warranty theory of liability
"born of the illicit intercourse of tort and contract").
12. SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 4.
13. See id. at 5.
14. See id The following competing public policy interests may be implicated in
any product liability tort case: punishment of tortfeasors, deterrence of potentially
harmful conduct without discouraging innovation and other socially useful conduct,
compensation of the injured and spreading the loss according to financial capacity to
bear that loss, and the furthering of convenient administration and predictability.
See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 14-27 (4th ed. 1971).
15. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 4-5. Compare Beshada v. Johns-
Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191,447 A.2d 539, 549 (1982) (cost of illness from a
dangerous product should be placed on those who profit from its production; this
position serves "the salutary goals of increasing product safety research and simplify-
ing tort trials") with Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 Ill. 2d. 26, 36-38, 402 N.E.2d
194, 199-200 (1980) (despite social desirability of encouraging research and the devel-
opment of beneficial drugs, a manufacturer will not be deemed the insurer of its
products).
16. SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 6. Data reveals that most products man-
1091
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possible task of complying with various, and often conflicting, legal
standards formulated by fifty-one different jurisdictions, whose stan-
dards are in a state of perpetual flux. The havoc this lack of uniform-
ity wreaks on product manufacturers is illustrated by the example of
the disparate standards states apply in determining when a manufac-
turer is liable for harm caused by a defectively designed product. 17 A
1982 review of the case law by the Senate Commerce Committee re-
vealed that, from one state to another
a product may be defective in design if: (1) [it] fails to per-
form as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when
used in a reasonably foreseeable manner, or the defendant
fails to prove that the benefits of the product outweigh its
risks; (2) it is unreasonably dangerous taking into considera-
tion the utility of the product and the risk involved in its
use; (3) it would not have been put into commerce by a rea-
sonable person aware of the harmful nature of the product;
(4) it left the supplier's control lacking any element to make
it safe for intended uses or possessing any feature that ren-
ders it unsafe for intended uses. Some States require proof
that the design defect rendered the product "unreasonably
dangerous," while others do not. A manufacturer seeking to
avoid design defect liability faces the difficult task of meet-
ing the design standard in each State in which it does
business. 18
Such disparate standards create a serious impediment to interstate
commerce. 19 The only way to end this chaotic and costly state of
affairs is through the creation of a uniform product liability law.2 0
B. The Inadequacy of Reform at the State Level
In 1977, the Federal Interagency Task Force on Product Liabil-
ufactured in a given state are used or consumed outside that state. Id. As a conse-
quence, "manufacturers and product sellers may be involved in product liability
actions governed by the law of any state in which they do business." Id. at 6-7. Thus,
any attempt by one state to resolve the uncertainties in the product liability tort
litigation system will be ineffective. Id. at 7.
17. See generaly, Hearings on S 2631 Before the Subcomm. for Consumers of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 276-80 (1982)
(statement of Charles Babcock, Esq. on behalf of National Association of
Manufacturers).
18. SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 4-5.
19. Id. at 10.
20. Id A federal product liability law will act to reduce burdens on interstate
commerce by achieving uniformity since it will be applied by all courts in all prod-
ucts liability actions. Id.
1092 [Vol. 28: p. 1088
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ity 2 ' concluded that a principal cause of the product liability problem
was the uncertainty inherent in the existing product liability tort liti-
gation system. Accepting this conclusion, the United States Depart-
ment of Commerce in 1979 drafted a Uniform Product Liability Act
("UPLA").22 The Carter Administration chose to offer the UPLA as
a model state law rather than as a federal law because 1) tort law had
traditionally been left to the states; 2) it believed states should be
given the opportunity to adopt uniform product liability law reform
legislation; and 3) it believed the federal government should first ad-
dress the problem of overly subjective product liability insurance
ratemaking procedures, a problem which the Task Force had identi-
fied as also contributing to the product liability problem.
23
The insurance ratemaking problem was later resolved by the fed-
eral government through Congress' enactment of the Risk Retention
Act of 1981.24 Yet, in the meantime, not a single state has adopted
the complete UPLA. Product liability tort reform measures have
been enacted in some form in at least thirty states. However, these
measures must be deemed incapable of affording the uniformity and
stability needed to resolve the product liability problem because
1) most fail to address critical product liability issues; 2) they inevita-
bly vary in what issues they treat and how they treat them; and
21. In April, 1976, a Federal Interagency Task Force was established by the
Economic Policy Board of the White House to study various problems in the field of
product liability. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at I-1. The Federal Inter-
agency Task Force was chaired by the Department of Commerce and was composed
of representatives from the Departments of Health, Education and Welfare; Housing
and Urban Development; Labor; Transportation; Treasury; the Council of Economic
Advisors; the Office of Management and Budget; and the Small Business Administra-
tion. The Consumer Product Safety Commission provided advice and assistance. Id
at 1-5. The Task Force study culminated in a final report in May of 1977. Id at I-I
to 1-11.
22. 44 Fed. Reg. 62714 (1979). As a result of the Task Force Report, the De-
partment of Commerce was asked to prepare an options paper regarding "what ac-
tion, if any, the Federal Government should take to address the product liability
problem." 43 Fed. Reg. 14612 (1978).
Subsequently, the Department of Commerce in its options paper recommended
that a uniform product liability law be prepared. 44 Fed. Reg. at 62714. On Janu-
ary 12, 1979, the "Draft Uniform Product Liability Law" was published in the Federal
Register. Id. Following extensive commentary on the draft law, the UPLA was of-
fered to the states as a model on October 31, 1979. Id
23. SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 2. For a discussion of the Task Force's
conclusions regarding problems with products liability insurance ratemaking proce-
dures, see TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at V-1 to V-50, VI-1 to VI-56, VII-114
to VII-172.
24. Risk Retention Act of 1981, 15 U.S.C. § 3901 (1982). Under this Act, man-
ufacturers can self-insure or they can band together, thereby obtaining lower group
insurance premiums. SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 3. The Act thus encourages
commercial insurers to offer product liability insurance at competitive rates and to
set premiums accurately. Id
1982-83] 1093
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3) none are comprehensive, state efforts at tort reform. 25 Federal leg-
islation is thus necessary and appropriate in this area. However, as
the next section of this article will detail, the toxic tort problem is
quite different.
III. THE Toxic TORT PROBLEM
The term "toxic tort" is not a pure legal term. It has a variety of
different meanings. To focus the issue for an evaluation of the need
for federal toxic tort legislation we suggest the following definition of
a toxic tort: a harm to a person that arises out of a non-traumatic
injury or, in other words, any injury attributable to exposure to a
toxic substance where injury is not immediately manifest. It is this
latency period between exposure to a toxic substance and the mani-
festation of injury which is inherent in the toxic tort problem and
which has created difficulties for the legal system.
So defined, the toxic tort problem still remains too broad for the
purposes of developing a meaningful analytic framework. Although
impact-type injuries such as those caused by machine tools or by di-
rect and caustic contact with acid are excluded by this definition, the
universe of toxic torts requires further classification. Toxic torts can
be further classified into three functional groups that can be defined
according to the predominant circumstances of exposure to toxic sub-
stances:2 6 occupational exposures, environmental or bystander expo-
sures, and consumer product exposures.
A. Occupatonal Exposures
Occupational exposures occur in the workplace and may involve
exposure in the course of mining, manufacturing, or processing the
toxic substance itself. They also can occur during the fabrication of
products which incorporate the substance, in other operations in
which the substance is a by-product or waste, or in a variety of con-
struction or servicing jobs which entail working with, or in proximity
to, the toxic substance.2 7 Harms resulting from occupational expo-
25. See Hollenshead, supra note 4, at 86-87.
26. It should be noted that, although the classes of toxic torts are distinguished
according to the nature of the exposure, the same toxic substance may engender toxic
tort claims in all three classes. For example, asbestos has been involved in claims
based upon 1) occupational exposures, such as those involving insulation workers;
2) environmental exposures, such as those involving persons residing near abandoned
asbestos processing facilities; and 3) consumer product exposures, such as those in-
volving hair dryers. See Ingram, Insurance Coverage Problems in Latent Dzsease and Injuty
Cases, 12 ENVTL. L. 317, 319-20 (1982); Comment, Lzabdity Insurance for Insidious Dis-
ease. Who Picks Up the Tab?, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 657 (1980).
27. See, e.g., I. SELIKOFF, DISABILITY COMPENSATION FOR ASBESTOS Associ-
1094 [Vol. 28: p. 1088
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sures are usually compensable under existing federal and state work-
ers' compensation programs 28 without any requirement of proving
employer fault and without any barriers to recovery based on em-
ployee negligence or misconduct. 29 Although historically there have
been certain impediments to effective occupational disease compensa-
tion in some of these programs3 0 -such as statutes of limitation which
did not accommodate the long latency periods typical of so many oc-
cupational diseases3 '-gradual reforms have substantially reduced
these barriers.3 2
Many workers, however, do not pursue their compensation rights
under worker compensation programs.33 Instead, they prefer to go
directly after third party manufacturers or other product sellers in
tort litigation.34 Although workers' compensation laws generally bar
tort suits against the victim's employer, 35 occupational disease tort
ATED DISEASE IN THE UNITED STATES 51-85 (U.S. Department of Labor Contract
Report 1982) [hereinafter cited as SELIKOFF REPORT] (discussing the occupations of
primary asbestos-disease risk).
28. Federal employees are covered under the Federal Employees Compensation
Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193 (1982). Each state, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the District
of Columbia covers occupational diseases under its worker compensation laws. lB A.
LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 41.10 (1982).
29. See A. LARSON, supra note 28, § 1.10. Negligence or willful misconduct on
the part of an employee is immaterial in compensation law, unless "it takes the form
of a deviation from the course of employment" or it is of a kind specifically made a
defense by state statute. Id. § 30.00.
30. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, AN INTERIM REPORT TO CONGRESS ON OC-
CUPATIONAL DISEASES 67-69 (1980) [hereinafter cited as INTERIM REPORT].
31. For example, New Jersey, known as one of the most liberal states with re-
spect to liability and compensation programs, until 1974 barred any occupational
disease claim not filed within five years of the last employment-related exposure. Oc-
cupational diseases may not become manifest, however, for decades following the
injurious exposure. See SELIKOFF REPORT, supra note 27, at 481, 511.
32. See IB A. LARSON, supra note 29, §§ 41.10, .31, .71. For example, there has
been an increase in the number of occupational diseases covered by state workers'
compensation statutes. See id § 41.71. But see INTERIM REPORT, supra note 30, at 67
(as of 1980 statutory barriers "severely limit such coverage in practice").
33. Shor, Workers' Compensation: Subsidies for Occupational Disease, J. PUB. HEALTH
POL'Y, Dec. 1980, reprinted in, Occupational Disease Compensation and Social Security: Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1981). See also SELIKOFF REPORT, supra note 30, at 374.
34. See Comment, Relief for Asbestos Victims: .A Legislate Analysis, 20 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 179, 182-83 (1983). The volume of litigation involving asbestos has re-
cently surpassed that concerning. Agent Orange, DES, the Dalkon Shield, and even
automobile injuries. Nat'l L.J., Aug. 18, 1980, at 1, col. 1; Nat'l L.J., Oct. 19, 1981, at
1, col. 1.
35. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 29, §§ 65.00-67.30. However, it should be noted
that in instances where occupational diseases are omitted from the coverage of a
compensation act because they are not within the concept of accidental injury, the
compensation act will not disturb any existing remedy. Id. § 65.00. Recently, the
employer's immunity from suit for work-related injuries covered under workers' com-
pensation has been somewhat eroded. Direct actions by employees against employers
8
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litigation is currently flooding the courts with third-party suits. 36
Commonly, the fact that the exposure occurred was known at the
time of the exposure, but the fact of its harmfulness was not then
known. Cases brought by asbestos workers against the manufacturers
of asbestos products are the best known and, by the sheer force of
their numbers, currently present the most extreme example of this
variety of toxic tort. 37
B. Environmental Exposures
Environmental or bystander exposures involve the exposure of
members of the public-at-large to toxic substances through the con-
tamination of air, water, or land. These exposures occur outside the
employment relationship and without any privity or other transac-
tional connection between the tortfeasor and the victim. In fact, un-
like the occupational exposure, usually both the tortfeasor and the
victim in an environmental exposure to a toxic substance are unaware
of the exposure and its harmfulness. 38 The environmental toxic tort
has received a great deal of political and media attention of late,39
have been permitted in some jurisdictions on several theories. See, e.g., Johns-
Manville Prods. Corp. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 478, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858,
866, 612 P.2d 948, 956 (1980) (fraudulent concealment of hazards from employees);
Mercer v. Uniroyal, Inc., 49 Ohio App. 2d 279, 283-86, 361 N.E.2d 492, 495-96
(1976) (injuries resulting from obligations arising out of employer's second or "dual"
capacity); Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907, 919 (W. Va. 1978) ("in-
tentional injury" shown by violation of safety laws, rules and regulations). See gener-
ally Marks, Erosion of the Exclusive Workers' Compensation Remedy: Suits Against Employers
and Compensation Carriers, 17 FORUM 395 (1981). Furthermore, employer immunity
has also been undercut by indirect actions in which the employer is sued for contribu-
tion or indemnity by a manufacturer against which an employee has recovered for an
occupational injury. See Larson, Third-Party Action Over Against Workers' Compensation
Employer, 1982 DUKE L.J. 483, 487.
36. See, e.g., Levy, Toxic Tort Litigation: A Plaintiff's Perspective, in ASBESTOS LITI-
GATION 75-76 (1982); Lublin, Occupational Diseases Receive More Scrutiny Since the
Manville Case, Wall St. J., Dec. 20, 1982, at 1, col. 6.
37. See Oversight Hearing on the Effect of the Manville and UNR Bankruptcies on Com-
pensation of Asbestos Victims: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the House
Comm. on Education and Labor, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.passim (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Oversight Hearing].
38. See Injuries and Damages From Hazardous Wastes-Analysis and Improvement of Le-
gal Remedies. A Report to Congress in Compliance With Section 301(e) of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-510) by the
"Superfund Section 301(e) Study Group", Senate Comm. on Environmental and Public
Works, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. Vol. I at 21-33, 43 (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter cited
as Superfund Report]. Furthermore, since most of these types of injuries have long
latency periods-sometimes 20 years or longer-a plaintiff who is not aware of the
exposure may not connect symptoms of a related disease to that exposure. See id at
43.
39. Eg., Sinclair, A Chemical Harvest, Wash. Post, Jan. 30, 1983, at 1, col. 1; Jan.
31, 1983, at 1, col. 4; Feb. 1, 1983, at 1, col. 3. Sinclair has pointed out that birth
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largely due to anxiety caused by the extreme uncertainty over the
potential breadth of the problem. Relatively few claims, however,
have been brought, and fewer still have been decided. 40 The Love
Canal-Hooker Chemical Company incident, in which the public was
exposed to toxic substances through contamination of the environ-
ment, is the best known example of this type of toxic tort problem.4 1
C. Consumer Product Exposures
Consumer product exposures involve harms caused by products
introduced into commerce for consumer use or consumption. Gener-
ally, in consumer product exposures, exposure to the product which
contains the toxic substance is intentional but the toxicity of the sub-
stance in its product form and concentration are unknown at the time
of exposure.42 Although the initial consumer knows the product seller
at the time of the sale, the long latency period before manifestation of
the harm may impair identification of the alleged tortfeasor. 43 Inju-
ries from pharmaceutical products such as those alleged in DES (di-
ethylstilbestrol) litigation illustrate the consumer product exposure
variety of toxic torts. 44
D. Determinihg the Need for Federal Legislation
The toxic tort problem thus consists of at least these three differ-
ent classes of harmful exposures. Each class poses very different
claims phenomena which, in turn, make very different demands on
the tort system. In assessing the case for federal legislation, we do not
defects, miscarriages, nerve and brain disorders, cancer, and other maladies may be
caused by common pesticides and herbicides, Id, Jan. 30, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
40. SuperfundReport, supra note 38, at 32. The paucity of claims for injuries from
hazardous wastes may stem from three factors. First, the problem of injury from
exposures to hazardous wastes is a relatively new one. Second, only recently has
there been awareness of a causal link between injury and exposure to hazardous
waste disposal. Third, most industrial defendants who have been implicated in such
litigation have preferred to settle rather than to litigate. Id.
41. See, e.g., A. LEVINE, LOVE CANAL: SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND PEOPLE (1982);
Bauer, Love Canal: Common Law Approaches to a Modem Tragedy, 11 ENVTL. L. 133
(1980).
42. The drug Bendectin is an example of a product giving rise to consumer
exposure problems. This drug was ingested by thousands of women to relieve morn-
ing sickness and neither consumers nor the manufacturer were aware of its apparent
toxicity until recently. See Lauter, Bendectin Trial Disintegrates, 5 Nat'l L.J., Feb. 21,
1983, at 1, col. 1. Bendectin, which has been marketed since 1956, is the only drug
approved for the treatment of morning sickness. Id. at 10, col. 3. The company
which manufactured this drug is currently faced with more than 150 federal suits in
which plaintiffs alleged birth defects as a result of ingestion of Bendectin. Id.
43. See Burch, Generic Products and the Problem of Identifying the Party Whose Product
Caused the Plaintlifs Injuqv, 17 FORUM 784 (1982).
44. See id.
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find that toxic torts meet the criteria which are found to justify fed-
eral tort reform legislation: the need for uniformity of legal standards
and the clear incapacity of the states to address the problem effec-
tively. Yet, that does not necessarily rule out a proper role for federal
legislation. We suggest that there are four additional factors relevant
in determining whether federal legislation may justifiably supplant
the existing state tort system as a mechanism for compensating toxic
tort victims:
1. A multiplicity of claims;
2. A long period of time between exposure and the mani-
festation of physical harm;
3. Difficulty in associating the victim's harm with a partic-
ular defendant; and
4. Significant federal responsibility for the problem.
None of these factors alone justifies a federal remedy, nor does
the absence of one obviate it. Rather, the greater the confluence of
these factors, the stronger the case for federal legislation. Conversely,
the less these factors characterize a branch of the toxic torts problem,
the stronger the case for leaving the problem to traditional tort
remedies.
1. Multiplicity of Claims
A substance may have been in widespread use for a very long
period of time before its toxicity became known.45 As a result, there
may have been so many persons exposed to it by that time that the
proverbial "flood of litigation" occurs. This flood of claims can so
overwhelm the deliberate institutional processes of the tort litigation
system that just claims cannot be adjudicated within an acceptable
time frame.46 Both the sheer volume of the claims and the legal de-
45. For example, DES was prescribed between 1947 and 1971 to more than one
million American women for the purpose of preventing miscarriages. Then, in 1971,
a link between exposure to DES th utero and the development of cancer and pre-
cancerous conditions was reported. See Barsky, Abandoning Federal Sovereign Immunity:
Pub/ic Compensation for Victims of Latently Defective Therapeutic Drugs, 2 J. PRODucTs L.
20, 25-26 (1983).
46. The situation in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas exemplifies the
problems posed by a flood of toxic tort litigation. As of 1982, 1,850 asbestos-related
cases were pending in Philadelphia and approximately 75 new cases were being filed
each month. See Pittsburgh Corning Corp. v. Bradley, 499 Pa. 291, 294, 453 A.2d
314, 315 (1982). Furthermore, since asbestos-related diseases often have a latency
period of 20 to 30 years, it is likely that asbestos cases will continue to be filed in
substantial numbers for years to come. See id
Although as of 1982 six judges in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas were
assigned to hear asbestos cases, fewer than 25 cases had reached a verdict. Id. Each
case was tried before a jury and lasted an average period of two and one-half weeks.
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fense and claims administration costs they would engender could be
sufficient to overwhelm the available financial resources of the re-
sponsible business defendants. 47 Furthermore, the defendants' prod-
uct liability insurance coverage may also be exhausted. As a result,
claimants may be left without an effective remedy under the tort sys-
tem. A federally legislated compensation system could be the only
answer to the paralysis which such a multiplicity of claims could in-
flict on the tort system.
Of the three classes of toxic torts, only in the realm of occupa-
tional exposures has there been such a multiplicity of claims phenom-
enon. For example, workers alleging that their workplace exposure to
asbestos gave them cancer, asbestosis, or other asbestos-related dis-
eases have clogged court dockets around the country. 48 The judicial
backlogs have not only intolerably deferred compensation of asbestos
claimants-all too often until after their death 49 -but they have also
impaired access to justice for all members of society. To date, three
asbestos companies have filed for reorganization in bankruptcy 50
Id at 315, 316. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has calculated that if the six
judges were to try all asbestos-related cases before juries, they could hear only 125
cases a year. As the court pointed out, "Even if no new asbestos cases were to be
filed, it would take nearlyfifleen years to dispose of the current inventory." Id at 316
(emphasis added). Furthermore, the court noted that even if all 57 judges in the trial
division did nothing but hear asbestos jury trials, it would take almost two years to
dispose of cases currently on the docket, and by that time another 1500 asbestos cases
would have been filed. Id at 316-17.
47. For a discussion of the impact that asbestos-related disease litigation has had
on the financial resources of asbestos manufacturers, see notes 51-52 and accompany-
ing text infra.
48. Some 20,000 such cases were pending against asbestos products manufactur-
ers by the end of 1982. Lublin, supra note 36. During 1982, workers filed new cases
at the rate of more than 450 per month. Hertzberg, Asbestos Lawsuits Spur War Among
Insurers, with Billions at Stake, Wall St. J:, June 14, 1982, at 1, col. 6. The backlog is
particularly extreme in cities where shipbuilding industries employed substantial
numbers of workers who were exposed to asbestos during the installation of insulation
in ships under construction. See id For example, in Philadelphia six judges were
assigned to hear asbestos cases on a full-time basis during 1982. Pittsburgh Corning
Corp. v. Bradley, 499 Pa. 291, 294, 453 A.2d 314, 315 (1982). In another attempt to
cope with the flood of asbestos litigation, the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas
promulgated a regulation which requires all asbestos-related litigation to be con-
ducted initially in a non-jury trial format. Id at 294-95, 453 A.2d at 315. Following
the completion of this non-jury trial, a party may demand a de novo trial by jury. Id
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently approved this rule, finding that it did
not unduly burden the parties' right to a jury trial, but instead was designed to avoid
intolerable delay in the litigation of asbestos suits. Id at 297-98, 453 A.2d at 317.
For a more detailed discussion of the burden asbestos litigation has placed upon the
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, see note 46 supra.
49. SELIKOFF REPORT, supra note 27, at 541.
50. The three major asbestos companies which have filed under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code are UNR Industries, the Manville Corporation, and Amatex
Corporation. See Tarnoff, Asbestos Broker Says Suits Forcing It Out of Business, Bus. Ins.,
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under the weight of present and anticipated claims, and other asbes-
tos companies are experiencing financial difficulties as a result of the
flood of asbestos claims against them.5 1 Insofar as the multiplicity of
claims factor is concerned then, there is at present a strong case for
federal intervention only for the compensation of injuries from occu-
pational exposures to asbestos.
2. Long Latency Periods
When long periods of time elapse from a person's exposure to a
toxic substance until the manifestation of his injury as a result of that
exposure, several things happen which make it difficult for the tort
system to function in its traditional remedial manner. The temporal
attenuation of the connection between the exposure and the discovery
of the injury can create substantial uncertainty about causation.
Causation issues such as whether the claimant was in fact exposed to
the toxic substance years before, what the circumstances of that expo-
sure were, whether there were other exposures to the substance for
which different persons bear responsibility, or whether there were ex-
posures to other substances which contribute to the injury, are
fraught with uncertainties. 52 In an area of forensic medicine where
even the simplest causation questions are matters of statistical
probability, 53 the long latency periods for harms associated with ex-
posures to certain substances severely confound the tort system's
mechanisms for determining causation. Such toxic tort cases are diffi-
cult to evaluate from a claims administration standpoint and are ex-
pensive to litigate.54
The problem of long latency periods also helps precipitate the
multiplicity of claims problem. Because of long latency periods, it
Feb. 21, 1983, at 2, col. 3. Each of these companies has alleged that its assets are, or
soon will be, outweighed by its liabilities from asbestos-related injury claims against
them. Id A fourth asbestos company has filed for liquidation under Chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code. Id
51. Companies not involved in the mining or selling of asbestos, such as a small
insulation contractor and a distributor of building products, are also being named as
defendants in a growing number of lawsuits. SeeJoseph, Firms That Didn't Mine or Sell
Asbestos are Also Caught in the Tide of Litigation, Wall St. J., Dec. 14, 1982, at 56, col. 1.
52. See Smith & Channon, The Rising Storm, 17 FORUM 139, 155-56 (1981). For
example, factors such as the effect of cigarette smoking may complicate the issue of
whether there is a causal link between a plaintiffs injury and his exposure to a toxic
substance. See Selikoff, Asbestos-Associated Disease, in ASBESTOS LITIGATION 29-30
(1982).
53. See e.g., Earley, Dioxin Is Sti//a Mysteqv, Wash. Post, Feb. 27, 1983, at B5, col.
1. Scientists, for instance, are deeply divided over the issue of whether dioxin is toxic
to humans. Id
54. See Nat'l Underwriter, Feb. 4, 1983, at 16. See also Oversight Hearng, supra
note 37 at 102 (testimony of M. Gaynor).
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was not until many years after exposures to various substances began
that modern epidemiological studies disclosed the toxic nature of
those substances. 55 Consequently, normal loss reduction mechanisms
did not operate to cut off these problems before they got out of hand.
In surveying the three exposure modes, it appears that the long
latency factor is common to them all. Although not all toxic torts are
characterized by long latency periods, this phenomenon gives all
three exposure classes their most difficult cases.
3. Difficulty in Identifying the Tortfeasor
Some toxic tort cases are complicated by difficulty in identifying
the tortfeasor. Because of the passage of time between exposure and
injury, or because of the more or less generic nature of the substance
involved, claimants may be unable to identify the party responsible
for the exposure. 56
. Yet, the tort system as we know it, even after the advent of strict
liability, allocates responsibility for the cost of harm to the person or
persons that caused the harm.5 1 In addition to the public policy in
favor of compensating persons for injuries caused by others, this
fundamenal principle of the tort system is also designed to serve the
public interest in punishing the tortfeasor and deterring similar con-
duct by others. 58 Historically there have only been rare exceptions to
the rule that liability may be imposed only on the person that caused
the harm.59 Lately, though, several courts confronted with toxic tort
55. DES, for example, was prescribed as early as 1947, but its harmful potential
was not established until 1971. Barsky, supra note 45, at 25-26. See also note 48 and
accompanying text supra.
56. LEVY, supra note 36, at 81-82.
57. See W. PROSSER,supra note 14, at 236. Consequently, a fundamental princi-
ple of product liability law is that a plaintiff must prove that the defendant manufac-
turer made the product which caused the injury. Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F.
Supp. 1004, 1007-08 (D.S.C. 1981).
58. W. PROSSER, supra note 14, at 23.
59. A paradigmatic exception to the requirement that liability may only be im-
posed on the person who caused the harm is set forth in the case of Summers v. Tce, 33
Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). In Summers, the plaintiff was shot by one of two
hunters who had each negligently fired his gun in the plaintiff's direction. Id. at 82,
199 P.2d at 2. Since the plaintiff was innocent and both defendants were culpable,
the court held that the defendants should bear the burden of uncertainty as to which
defendant actually caused the injury. Id. at 88, 199 P.2d at 5. Consequently, if one
of the defendants could not prove that his shot was not the one that struck the plain-
tiff, then he would be held liable. Id, 199 P.2d at 5. The principle of Summers has
been codified in the Restatement of Torts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 433B(3) (1965). For a more detailed discussion of Summers and other cases which
are exceptions to the requirement that tort liability be imposed only upon the party
who caused the harm, see Comment, Coping with the Particularized Problems of Toxic Tort
Litigation, 28 VILL. L. REV. 1298 (1983).
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cases have refused to adhere to this key axiom of tort law. 60
In two recent toxic tort cases, the highest courts of California and
New York have held that liability for injuries allegedly caused by
DES can be imposed upon defendant-manufacturers without proof
that those defendants made the DES which caused the plaintiffs' in-
jury.61 In Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,62 the California Supreme Court
accomplished this result by fashioning a "market share" theory of lia-
bility.6 3 Under this theory, each defendant was liable for the propor-
tion of the judgment represented by its share of the DES market
unless the defendant could demonstrate that it could not have made
the product which injured the plaintiff.64 Subsequently, in Bichler v.
Eli Lilly & Co. ,65 the New York Court of Appeals affirmed a jury
60. For a detailed discussion of the development of legal theories which circum-
vent the requirement that tort liability only be imposed upon the party who actually
caused the harm, see Comment, supra note 59.
61. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163
Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d
571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1982).
62. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. dented, 449 U.S. 912
(1980). The plaintiff in Sindell, on behalf of herself and 100 other similarly situated
women, brought an action against 11 drug companies. She alleged that ingestion of
the defendants' DES had resulted in cancerous vaginal or cervical growths in the
daughters of women who had taken the drug. Id at 594-95, 607 P.2d at 925-26, 163
Cal. Rptr. at 133-34.
63. Seid. at 611-13, 607 P.2d at 637-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145-46. InSindell, the
plaintiff was unable to prove which one of the defendants had produced the DES
that her mother had taken. Id at 598, 607 P.2d at 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136. Conse-
quently, the plaintiff relied upon three theories of liability-alternative liability, con-
cert of action, and enterprise liability. Id at 597-610, 607 P.2d at 928-35, 163 Cal.
Rptr. at 136-43. Each of these theories is designed to allow a plaintiff to recover
without identifying the defendant who had manufactured the DES ingested by her
mother. See id at 598, 607 P.2d at 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136. For a detailed discus-
sion of these three theories, see Comment, supra note 59. Concluding that none of
these three theories would allow the plaintiff to recover on the facts before the court,
the California Supreme Court opted instead to apply a "market share" theory of
liability. Id at 610-13, 607 P.2d at 936-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-46. The market
share theory of liability is a hybrid of the alternative and enterprise theories of liabil-
ity. See Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571, 580 n.5, 436 N.E.2d 182, 185-86
n.5, 430 N.Y.S.2d 776, 779-80 n.5 (1982).
64. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. According
to the Stndell court, under the market share theory, a DES plaintiff only needs to join
in the action the manufacturers of a substantial share of the DES which her mother
might have taken. Id (emphasis added). A defendant can avoid liability by proving
that it could not have manufactured the product which caused the plaintiff's injury.
Id If a manufacturer fails to establish such a defense, it will be liable for that per-
centage of the plaintiff's injuries which corresponds to its share of the market, but not
for the entire damages resulting from the plaintiffis injuries. Id
65. 55 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1982). The plaintiff in
Bich/er was a DES daughter who brought suit against Lilly for damages sustained
from cervical and vaginal cancer. The plaintiff alleged that the cancer was caused by
her mother's ingestion of DES while pregnant. Id at 578, 436 N.E.2d at 184, 450
N.Y.S.2d at 778.
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verdict against a manufacturer of DES which was based upon the
plaintiff's theory that Lilly, in concert with other DES manufacturers,
had wrongfully marketed this drug without proper testing. 66 Under
this so-called "concert of action" theory, the court in Bichler had
found the defendant liable for the plaintiff's injuries even though the
plaintiff had failed to prove that Lilly-the only defendant named in
the suit-was the manufacturer of the DES that the plaintiff's mother
had ingested.6 1
In both Sindell and Bzchler, the rationale underlying the courts'
decisions was the same. In each case, the court was confronted with
what it deemed to be an innocent victim unable to prove which man-
ufacturer harmed her 68 because of the long latency of the injury cou-
pled with the similarity among the products of the different
manufacturers. 69 Faced with a choice between not compensating the
victim and holding liable a company which may not have caused the
66. Id. at 578, 436 N.E.2d at 184-85, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 778-79. The concert of
action theory of liability "rests upon the principle that '[a]ll those who, in pursuance
of a common plan or design to commit a tortious act, actively take part in it, or
further it by cooperation or request, or who lend aid or encouragement to the wrong-
doer, or ratify and adopt his acts done for their benefit, are equally liable with him."
Id. at 580, 436 N.E.2d at 186, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 780 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 876 (1965)).
67. See id. at 578, 436 N.E.2d at 185, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 779. The defendants in
Bzchler had requested a bifurcated trial. Id, 436 N.E.2d at 184, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 778.
The first stage of this trial concerned the identity of the manufacturer of the DES
actually consumed by the plaintiff's mother. The Bichler jury concluded that the
plaintiff had not established that the defendant was the manufacturer. Id. at 578,
436 N.E.2d at 184, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 778-79. In the second stage of the trial, the jury
determined that Lilly and other DES manufacturers had wrongfully marketed the
drug for use in preventing miscarriages because they had not performed proper labo-
ratory testing prior to sale to the public. Id. at 578, 436 N.E.2d at 185, 450 N.Y.S.2d
at 779.
The trial court had instructed the jury that Lilly could be liable if the jury found
either that there was a conscious parallel agreement between Lilly and other DES
manufacturers to market DES without proper testing, or that Lilly's failure to test
the drug properly prior to marketing substantially encouraged or assisted other DES
manufacturers to do likewise. Id. at 581-82, 436 N.E.2d at 186-87, 450 N.Y.S.2d at
780-81. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court's instructions on con-
certed action were erroneous and that the evidence before the jury had been legally
insufficient to support a verdict for the plaintiff under the concert of action theory.
Id at 579, 436 N.E.2d at 184, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 779. The New York Court of Appeals
rejected both of these contentions and concluded that the evidence was sufficient to
support recovery under either the conscious parallel action or the substantial assist-
ance branches of the concert of action theory. Id at 579, 585, 436 N.E.2d at 185, 188,
450 N.Y.S.2d at 779, 782.
68. See Sihdell, 26 Cal. 3d at 610-11, 607 P.2d at 936-37, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-
45; Bichler, 55 N.Y.2d at 579, 436 N.E.2d at 185, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 779.
69. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 600-01, 607 P.2d at 929-30, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 137-38;
Bich/er, 55 N.Y.2d at 579, 436 N.E.2d at 185, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 779.
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harm, each court chose a theory which would permit compensation of
the victim.
Rulings of this type dispense with a fundamental element of the
tort system-proof that the defendant was responsible for the plain-
tiffs harm. Such rulings disrupt the reasonable expectations of both
manufacturers and insurers concerning the limits of their liability.
They also have an adverse effect on a manufacturer's incentive to pro-
duce safe products, which a fault-based tort system otherwise pro-
motes.70 Furthermore, the greatly increased potential liability which
such rulings impose upon defendants might even discourage manu-
facturers from undertaking socially desirable manufacturing activities
altogether .7 1
To the extent that the difficulties toxic tort victims experience in
identifying the responsible tortfeasor cause judges to abandon tradi-
tional tort principles, federal legislative alternatives become more at-
tractive. Notably, difficulty in identifying the responsible tortfeasors
seem to characterize all three toxic tort modes.
4. Federal Responsibility
A final factor which would militate in favor of a federal legisla-
tive solution to all or part of the toxic torts problem would be
whether the federal government bears a significant share of responsi-
bility for the harms involved. The federal government may be re-
sponsible for injuries to individuals caused by exposure to toxic
substances. However, because of its sovereign immunity defenses 72
70. Theories of liability like those adopted in Sindell and Bichler allow "Peter to
be blamed for the harm caused by Paul." This practice of attributing liability to a
defendant who did not actually cause the injury badly distorts incentives to provide
better warnings, extra testing, or quality control.
71. See Fischer, Product Lt'abt'y: An Analysts of Market Share Ltability, 34 VAND. L.
REV. 1623, 1661 (1981). A reduction in the marketing of potentially utilitarian prod-
ucts could result "if potential defendants fear that their losses will be too prohibitive
for them to pass on to the public." Id
72. The United States, as sovereign, may be sued only in those situations in
which it has expressly consented to be sued. See United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S.
535, 538 (1980); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941). The United
States has, subject to certain restrictions, consented to certain limited types of suits.
The Tucker Act, for example, waives immunity with respect to claims arising out of
express or implied contracts between private parties and the federal government. See
28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The Federal Tort Claims Act also
waives sovereign immunity with respect to claims for damages which allege negli-
gence by a federal employee acting within the scope of his office "under circum-
stances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant
in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." See 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976). The Federal Tort Claims Act has been further restricted in
scope through judicial interpretation. See, e.g., Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United
States, 431 U.S. 666, 668-74 (1977) (Act precludes claims brought by third-party
1104 [Vol. 28: p. 1088
17
Schwartz and Means: The Need for Federal Product Liability and Toxic Tort Legislation
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1983
1982-83] NEED FOR FEDERAL PRODUCT LIABILITY 1105
and its protection under various federal exclusive remedy compensa-
tion systems, 73 many of these injuries will go uncompensated, or pri-
vate companies will have to bear the federal government's share of
the liability, with a potentially disastrous impact upon such compa-
nies.74 Remedial federal legislation is therefore needed under these
circumstances to at least mitigate the unfairness of the federal govern-
ment's immunity from its own tort liability. 75
private citizens for injuries to military personnel); Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 802-
03 (1972) (Act precludes claim based on strict liability in tort for ultrahazardous
activity); United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 163 (1963) (Act precludes claim
based on intentional tort); United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696, 710-11 (1961)
(Act precludes claims for negligent or willful misrepresentation); Feres v. United
States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950) (Act precludes action for injuries to servicemen
where injuries arise in course of activity incident to military service).
73. For example, the Veterans' Benefits Act is the exclusive remedy against the
government that is available to a member of the military who is injured while on
active duty. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 301-362 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Consequently, a ser-
viceman may not bring an action against the federal government under the Federal
Tort Claims Act even if he could show that his injury was caused by the negligence of
the government. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
Similarly, the Federal Employees' Compensation Act is the exclusive remedy for
civilian government employees. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193 (1982). See, e.g., Granade
v. United States, 356 F.2d 837, 840 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. dented, 385 U.S. 1012 (1967)
(Federal Employees' Compensation Act is the exclusive remedy for employees who
come within its coverage and no concurrent remedy exists under the Federal Tort
Claims Act). But cf., Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 1033
(1983) (the exclusive liability provision of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act
does not preclude a third-party from bringing an indemnity action against the fed-
eral government under the Federal Tort Claims Act).
74. For example, the extensive use of asbestos has led to "thousands of pending
and potential lawsuits." Comment, supra note 34, at 179. This deluge of claims
threatens to bankrupt defendants who may have to pay billions of dollars for defense
and idemnification costs. See id.
75. See, e.g., Oversight Hearthg,supra note 37, at 18-19 (letter from Assistant Attor-
ney General McConnell). A case which illustrates the need for legislation to mitigate
the unfairness of governmental immunity from liability is Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v.
United States. See 431 U.S. 666 (1977). In Stencel, a military officer brought suit for
personal injuries he suffered when his emergency eject system malfunctioned. Id. at
667-68. Named as defendants were Stencel, who manufactured the system, and the
United States. Id Stencel filed a cross-claim against the United States, charging
that any malfunction in the system was due to faulty specifications, requirements,
and components which the government had supplied to Stencel for use in the eject
system. Id. at 668. Stencel also claimed that the malfunctioning system had been in
the exclusive control and custody of the United States government since its manufac-
ture. Thus, Stencel maintained that if it were negligent at all, its negligence was
passive, whereas the negligence of the United States government was active. Accord-
ingly, Stencel sought indemnification from the government for any sums it would be
required to pay the injured officer. Id.
The officer's suit against the federal government was dismissed because the Feres
doctrine bars military personnel from suing the United States under the Federal Tort
Claims Act for injuries sustained "incident to military service." Id. at 669 (quoting
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. at 135,142 (1950)). The district court also dismissed
Stencel's cross-claim against the United States. Id. at 674. On appeal this dismissal
was upheld by the Supreme Court. Id. The Court reasoned that the policy consider-
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Although the federal government has not yet acknowledged any
legal liability for claims involving toxic torts, the government should
shoulder some of the responsibility for the victims' injuries in at least
three types of occupational toxic tort cases.76 First, the government
should assume responsibility for the thousands of claims which mili-
tary employees have brought for injuries allegedly caused by dioxin,
commonly known as "Agent Orange," a chemical defoliant used
widely by the military in Vietnam. 77  Secondly, the government
should bear responsibility for the claims alleging occupational expo-
sure to dangerous levels of radiation which civilian and military per-
sonnel have filed against the United States and private contractors
ations underlying the Feres doctrine also served to bar a claim for indemnity by a
government contractor who has been named as defendant by injured military person-
nel. Id. at 673.
As a result of the Stencel decision, a government contractor will often be left
"holding the bag" for compensation of injured military personnel, even though the
government was equally, or even entirely, at fault. Because the decision allows the
federal government to externalize the costs of its own negligent conduct, the policies
underlying the tort system are frustrated. Not only is the result unjust, but there is
also little incentive for the government to exercise due care since it will bear no re-
sponsibility for the consequences. See Lee & Chierichella, Product Liability Problems for
Government Contractors, CONT. MGMT. 18 (July, 1981); Tobak, A Case of Mtstaken Liabil-
ity: The Government Contractor's Liability for Injunes Incurred by Members of the Armed Forces,
13 PUB. CoNT. L.J. 74 (1982); Comment, Tort Remedies for Servicemen Injured by Mitay
Equipment. A Case for Federal Common Law, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 601 (1980).
76. For a discussion of the three types of occupational toxic tort cases where
federal responsibility is particularly warranted, see notes 77-83 and accompanying
text in/ra. Cf Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 1033 (1983) (re-
flecting the Court's recent recognition of this problem and apparently making an
inroad against it by allowing third-party indemnity action under the Federal Tort
Claims Act); Keene Corp. v. United States, No. 57979C (Ct. Cl., Dec. 21, 1979) (seek-
ing implied indemnity in contract from United States government for asbestos judg-
ments against Keene).
77. See Yannacone, Kavenagh & Searcy, Agent Orange Litigation. Cooperation for
V'ictory, TRIAL, Feb. 1982, at 44; Banham, Claims Against Orange May Involve Billions of
Dollars, J. of Comm., Oct. 4, 1982, at 7C, col. 1. See also In re "Agent Orange"
Product Liability Litigation, 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
The plaintiffs in these Agent Orange actions are Vietnam veterans and members
of their families. In re Agent Orange, 506 F. Supp. at 768. They seek to recover for
personal injuries suffered as a result of exposure to a number of herbicides including
Agents Orange, Pink, Purple, and Green. Id at 768 n. 1. Furthermore, family mem-
bers of the exposed military personnel allege that exposure of their husbands or par-
ents to these agents caused miscarriages, genetic injuries and birth defects. Id at 769.
At least 19 different chemical companies who contracted with the federal govern-
ment are named as defendants in these lawsuits. Id at 768 n.2. These defendants
have initiated third-party complaints against the federal government which allege,
inter alia, misuse of product, post-discharge failure to warn, and implied indemnity.
Id. at 769.
The potential number of persons afflicted with disease caused by Agent Orange
could be in the thousands. See Yannacone, Kavenagh & Searcy, supra, at 46. The
enormity of the problem is illustrated by a class action suit filed in New York in
which at least 400 plaintiffs had joined by 1982. Id at 48.
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working for, or supplying uranium to, the government's atomic en-
ergy programs.78
The third group of cases in which federal responsibility is justi-
fied involves claims that public and private employees have filed
against asbestos suppliers, asbestos product manufacturers and pri-
vate contractors. There are thousands of these claims in which plain-
tiffs allege that they contracted an asbestos-related disease after being
exposed to asbestos, usually in the course of this nation's shipbuilding
program during the 1940's and 1950's. 79 By requiring the use of as-
bestos in its shipbuilding program,8 0 by selling asbestos to private
contractors from its own stockpile,8 1 and by failing to promulgate,
adhere to, or enforce adequate health and safety requirements, 8 2 the
78. See generally Radiation Exposure Compensation Act of 1981-Part 2: Hearing Before
the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources on S. 1483, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
Senate Bill 1483 was introduced after substantial evidence revealed that the U.S.
government did not adequately protect citizens who lived or worked in the vicinity of
radioactive fallout from the Nevada nuclear bomb tests conducted from 1951 to
1963. Id at 1. Recent scientific studies have concluded that residents of communi-
ties downwind of the Nevada test site suffered higher incidences of radiation-related
cancers than would otherwise have been expected. Id See also Begay v. United
States, No. C 80-92 (D. Ariz.) (pending claim by uranium miners against the federal
government), noted in Toxic Chemicals Litigation Reporter 511 (Sept. 5, 1983).
79. See Oversight Hearing, supra note 37, at 4 (statement of Assistant Attorney
General McGrath). See also Pittsburgh Corning Corp. v. Bradley, 499 Pa. 291, 294,
453 A.2d 314, 315 (1982); Wall St. J., Dec. 14, 1982 at 56, col. 1.
Most occupational exposure to asbestos has occurred since the beginning of
World War II, with an estimated 4.5 million workers having been exposed to asbestos
dust in public or private shipyards. Comment, supra note 37, at 181, 194.
80. Oversight Hearing, supra note 37, at 56-59 (letter to Manville Corp. from Kirk-
land & Ellis). See Keene Corp. v. United States, 700 F.2d 836, 838-39 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 104 S.Ct. i95 (1983).
Government specifications required that each ship built for the Navy in public
or private shipyards have asbestos for insulation. See, e.g., Occupational Diseases and
Their Compensation, Part /.- Asbestosis-Related Disease. Hearings on HR. 2740 Before Sub-
comm. on Labor Standards of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
230 [hereinafter cited as 1979 House Hearings] (statement of Allen B. Coates, Gen.
Rep., Metal Trades Dept., AFL-CIO); N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1982, § 3, at 16, col. 3
(letter of Glen W. Bailey).
81. See Keene Corp. v. United States, 700 F.2d 836, 838-39 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
104 S.Ct. 195 (1983). Oversight Hearing, supra note 37, at 57 (letter to Manville Corp.
from Kirkland & Ellis), 4 (statement of Assistant Attorney General McGrath), 71
(testimony of Earl Parker, Senior Vice President, Manville Corp.)
The government began to stockpile asbestos as a strategic material prior to
World War II. After Pearl Harbor, the government restricted its use to fulfill Navy
and other maritime requirements. See Letter from Edward W. Warren, Kirkland &
Ellis to Earl Parker, Vice President, Manville Corp. (Sept. 8, 1982) [hereinafter cited
as Warren-Parker letter] (copy available from Subcommittee on Labor Standards of
the House Committee on Education and Labor).
82. See Keene Corp. v. United States, 700 F.2d 836, 838-39 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 195 (1983); Oversight Hearing, supra note 37, at 56-59 (letter to Manville
Corp. from Kirkland & Ellis). The Navy set its own minimum requirements for
safety and health in government contractor shipyards. See Oversight Hearng, supra
1107
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federal government bears responsibility for approximately one-half of
the claims brought to date.8 3 However, private companies have
borne the full burden of claims brought by asbestos disease victims8 4
because of the inability of asbestos victims to sue the federal govern-
ment8 5 and the existence of workers' compensation laws that permit
workers stricken with asbestos-related disease to sue the companies
which supplied asbestos to the government.8 6
For these three types of occupational toxic tort cases, in which
there has been significant involvement by the federal government,
note 37, at 56-59; U.S. NAVY DEPT. AND U.S. MARITIME COMM'N, MINIMUM RE-
QUIREMENTS FOR SAFETY AND INDUSTRIAL HEALTH IN CONTRACT SHIPYARDS
§ 137 (1943). The Navy and Maritime Commission called for "special ventilation,"
"special respirators," and "periodic medical examinations" as part of its safety and
health requirements for contracting shipyards. Warren-Parker Letter, supra note 81,
at 3 n.4. The Navy experts even opined that the absence of precautionary devices for
handling asbestos might result in shipyard employees contracting asbestos-related
disease. See id at 4. The time pressures resulting from wartime necessity appear to
be the only explanation for the government's failure to adhere to its own health and
safety regulations. See id.
83. See Class Action Complaint for Estimation of Contingent Unliquidated As-
bestos-Related Health Claims at 26, Johns-Manville Corp. v. Ward, (filed Dec. 15,
1982) in In re Johns-Manville Corp., Nos. 82-B-1156 to 82-B-1176 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
filed Aug. 26, 1982); Oversight Hearing, supra note 37, at 68 (testimony of Earl Parker,
Senior Vice President, Manville Corp.).
The federal government appears to have had at least as much knowledge about
the potential health hazards of asbestos as the asbestos industry did. See Comment,
supra note 34, at 194 (footnote omitted). Furthermore, the Navy failed to adopt any
standard for worker exposure to asbestos in its shipyards until 1973. Warren-Parker
Letter, supra note 81, at 6. The Navy's standards were therefore instituted eight years
afier the publication of Dr. Selikoff's report which linked exposure to asbestos with
disease of the lung in asbestos workers. See Selikoff, Churg & Hammond, The Occur-
rence of Asbestosis Among Industrial Insulation Workers, 132 ANNALS. N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 139,
152 (1965).
84. See Warren-Parker Letter, supra note 81, at 7. Currently, there are more
than 30,000 product liability suits pending against 260 asbestos concerns. See Wall
St. J., Aug. 27, 1982, at 1, col. 6. This litigation is probably just the beginning of an
even greater onslaught of cases. Podgers, Toxic Time Bombs, 67 A.B.A. J. 139 (1981).
According to one commentator, a minimum of 200,000 asbestos-related deaths can
be anticipated by the year 2000. Winter, 68 A.B.A. J. 398 (1982) (quoting Dr. Irving
Selikoff, Director of the Environmental Sciences Laboratory at New York City's Mt.
Sinai School of Medicine).
85. For a discussion of the government's immunity from tort liability, see notes
72-75 and accompanying text supra.
86. See Comment, supra note 34, at 182-83. In addition, in the asbestos context
two major problems sometimes preclude a workers' compensation system remedy. Id.
at 182. First, workers or their surviving dependents often do not know that compen-
sation benefits are available to them. ld. Secondly, some injured workers who file for
benefits may be barred from recovery since some states require that disability occur
within a specified time from exposure to a hazardous condition. See id. at 183 n.31.
See also Asbestos Health Hazards Compensation Act of 1980. Hearngs on S. 2847 Before the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 239 (1980) [hereinafter
referred to as 1980 Hearings] (statement of Andrew T. Haas, General President of the
Int'l Ass'n of Heat and Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers).
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one option which deserves serious consideration is federal legislation
establishing a compensation system.8 Under such a national compen-
sation plan, the federal government would be required to make a con-
tribution reflecting its proportionate share of responsibility. By
enacting legislation providing for such federal "contributions," the
federal government would be equitably providing for the victims of
asbestos-related disease without exposing itself to full tort liability. 88
IV. THE NEED FOR A FEDERAL COMPENSATION SYSTEM IN THE
AREA OF Toxic TORTS
The more the four factors described above8 9 characterize a class
of toxic torts, the more the capability of the tort system to function
87. Several compensation fund proposals have been submitted to Congress but
none have received Congressional approval. See, e.g., Occupational Health Hazards
Compensation Act, H.R. 5735, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. H715 (daily ed.
Mar. 4, 1982); Asbestos Health Hazards Compensation Act, H.R. 5224, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H9670 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1981); Asbestos Health Hazards
Compensation Act, S. 1643, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S10033 (daily ed.
Sept. 18, 1981). These bills-known as the Miller, Fenwick, and Hart bills-con-
tained significant points of disagreement as to 1) who should be eligible to receive
benefits; 2) who should contribute to the fund; 3) who should administer the pay-
ments; 4) what should happen to litigation pending at the time of enactment of the
bill, and 5) what disease-causing substances should a proposed compensation plan
cover. See Comment, supra note 34, at 186. Congress has not yet found an acceptable
solution to the problems associated with affording relief to victims of asbestos expo-
sure. See id The questions of which parties should contribute to a proposed compen-
sation fund, and whether the federal government should be a participant, have
generated heated debate. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1982, § 3, at 21, col. I (letter
of Former Rep. Millicent Fenwick); N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1982, § 3, at 16, col. 3 (let-
ters of Glen W. Bailey & William C. McLaughlin).
88. See 1979 House Hearings, supra note 80, at 531 (statement of Rep. Beard).
With regard to who is responsible for asbestos-related disease, Rhode Island Demo-
crat Edward Beard, the former Chairman of the Subcommittee on Labor Standards
of the House Committee on Education and Labor, has stated as follows:
I honestly believe that it is a combination of industry and Government
... . If I had to make a judgment, I would say simply, "Mr. McKinney
[President of the Manville Corp.], your company is guilty. The Navy, you
are guilty. . . . All the government agencies, OSHA and everyone that
still allows that product to be used all over the country, are very much
guilty."
Id.
Although such universal culpability may not be found in each individual case,
Representative Beard's remarks reflect the fairness of requiring the federal govern-
ment to contribute to a fund for compensating victims of a disease which is a "hidden
cost of World War II for which many Americans are still paying." See 127 CONG.
REC. S 10,033 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1981) (statement of Sen. Hart).
89. These four factors are as follows: 1) multiplicity of claims; 2) long latency
periods between exposure to the toxic substance and manifestation of disease; 3) diffi-
culty in identifying the tortfeasor; and 4) significant federal responsibility for the
problem. For a more detailed discussion of these four factors, see notes 45-88 and
accompanying text supra.
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effectively in the fulfillment of its social policy objectives 9° is im-
paired. Consequently, the greater the implication of these four fac-
tors in a particular class of toxic tort claims, the stronger the case is
for federal intervention. Indeed, where all of these factors operate to
frustrate the objectives of the tort system, they may so overstress and
corrode it that even its general social utility in other areas is under-
mined and perverted. This stress on the tort system has manifested
itself in overcrowding the court docket, 9' in the courts' resort to un-
wieldy and unfair legal doctrines, 92 and in the generation of ex-
traordinary litigation costs. 93
We can see these dangers at work as the tort system struggles to
cope with asbestos claims resulting from occupational exposure. All
four factors which militate in favor of a federal compensation system
strongly characterize the asbestos claims problem. Yet, the lack of an
alternative compensation mechanism has forced the courts to impro-
vise.94 Faced with impossible demands on their resources, the courts
have increasingly required defendants in asbestos cases to compensate
plaintiffs without regard to established principles of tort liability.95
Seeking only to compensate asbestos victims and ignoring the other
public policies which underlie tort law, the courts are turning the tort
system into a bastardized, quasi-compensation system.
This mistake of forcing the square peg of the asbestos claims
90. For a discussion of the social policy objectives underlying the tort system, see
notes 57-58 & 71 and accompanying text supra.
91. For a discussion of the impact that asbestos litigation alone has had upon
the judicial system, see notes 46 & 48 and accompanying text supra.
92. For a discussion of some legal theories state courts have recently developed
which assign liability to a defendant who may not have actually caused a plaintiff's
injury, see notes 62-68 and accompanying text supra.
93. The length and complexity of asbestos litigation has led to enormous legal
costs. See 1980 Heartngs, supra note 86, at 244 (statement of Andrew T. Haas). As a
result, a large percentage of the damage and settlement awards in asbestos-related
disease cases goes to attorneys and insurance companies. See Comment, supra, note
37, at 183-84. For example, when Manville filed for bankruptcy, its legal fees totaled
$24.5 million, while the amount the corporation had dispensed for asbestos-related
injuries was less-$24 million. Wall St. J., Aug. 30, 1982, at 3, col. 1. A similar
picture is painted by the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Keene Corporation,
another manufacturer of asbestos, who has estimated that 73% of settlement funds
goes toward legal fees, 15% to insurance companies, and only 10% to victims. N.Y.
Times, Mar. 7, 1982, § 3, at 16, col. 3.
The "costs involved in investigating, pursuing, and defending a claim are a
drain" on the productivity of manufacturers and product sellers. SENATE REPORT,
supra note 10, at 7. Legal costs are, in turn, "generally passed on to consumers in the
form of higher product prices." Id
94. Several asbestos compensation fund proposals have failed to receive serious
consideration in previous sessions of Congress. For a discussion of these proposals, see
note 87 supra.
95. See notes 60-69 and accompanying text supra.
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problem into the formerly round hole of the tort system can be seen in
the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Beshada v. Johns-
Manville Products Corp. 96 Totally departing from established principles
and precedents to sustain a cause of action for a group of asbestos
victims against asbestos manufacturers, the Beshada court held that a
state-of-the-art defense 97 is not available in a product liability case
brought under a strict liability theory for failure to warn. 98 The effect
of this decision is to make a manufacturer liable for failure to warn of
a danger of which it was impossible for the manufacturer to have
known at the time.99 In an unbridled desire to compensate the
Beshada plaintiffs, 0 0 the court thus summarily transformed the law of
96. 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982). In Beshada, the plaintiffs were workers, or
survivors of deceased workers, who claimed to have been exposed to asbestos for vary-
ing periods of time. Id at 196, 447 A.2d 542. The plaintiffs alleged that as the result
of being exposed to asbestos, they contracted various asbestos-related diseases. Id.,
447 A.2d at 542. They sought recovery under the theory of strict liability for failure
to warn of the hazards of working with asbestos. See id at 197, 447 A.2d at 542.
The plaintiffs in Beshada had been exposed to asbestos as far back as the 1930's.
The defendants, however, had not provided warnings relating to the hazards of as-
bestos until the 1960's, because it was not until then that the medical profession dis-
covered that a potential health hazard arose from the use of insulation products
containing asbestos. Id at 196-97, 447 A.2d at 542.
The defendants, asbestos manufacturers and distributors of asbestos products,
asserted the state-of-the-art defense, and alleged that nobody in the asbestos industry
knew or could have known that asbestos was dangerous when it was marketed. Id at
197, 447 A.2d at 542. The trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion to strike this state-
of-the-art defense. In the appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court, the sole issue was
whether defendants in a product liability case based upon strict liability to warn may
raise the state-of-the-art defense. Id at 196, 447 A.2d at 542.
97. The state-of-the-art defense provides that distributors of products can only
be held liable for injuries which result from dangers that were scientifically discovera-
ble at the time the product was distributed. Id at 202, 447 A.2d at 545. The defend-
ants in Beshada claimed that because knowledge of the dangers of asbestos was
scientifically unavailable at the time of the manufacture or distribution of the prod-
uct, they could not have known that the product was dangerous and therefore they
acted reasonably in marketing it without a warning. Id at 204, 447 A.2d at 546.
98. Id at 209, 447 A'2d at 549. The Beshada court decided that in a strict liabil-
ity warning case, the test is whether the risk from the product has been reduced to the
greatest extent possible without hindering the product's utility. Id at 201, 447 A.2d
at 545 (citing Freund v. Cellofilm Products, Inc., 87 N.J. 229, 432 A.2d 925 (1981)).
To avoid the applicability of the state-of-the-art defense in the case before it, the
court characterized it as a negligence defense which had no utility in strict liability
cases. Id. at 204, 447 A.2d at 546.
99. See id at 204, 447 A.2d at 546. According to the Beshada court, when a
product is unsafe, it is immaterial that it was unsafe because the defendant could not
have been aware of the danger given the state of technology. Id, 447 A.2d at 546.
100. See i. at 209, 447 A.2d at 549. The Beshada court stated that
[t]he burden of illness from dangerous products such as asbestos should be
placed upon those who profit from its production and, more generally,
upon society at large, which reaps the benefits of the various products our
economy manufactures. That burden should not be imposed exclusively on
the innocent victim. . . . [The]victims . . . should be spared the burden-
some financial consequences of unfit products.
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strict liability into absolute liability. 101 Contrary to tort law jurispru-
dence,10 2 the court effectively ruled that the manufacturer of a prod-
uct is in fact an insurer of its product.'0 3 The Beshada court thus went
a long way toward creating a compensation system funded by tort
law damages. 104
Beshada, like S'nde// 105 and B'chler, 106 illustrates the problems
generated when courts attempt to fashion legislative solutions for spe-
cial toxic tort problems. On the other hand, a properly designed leg-
islative compensation system could promptly and fairly compensate
all deserving claimants, avoid or overcome the four toxic torts prob-
lem factors we have identified and not pervert the tort system in the
process.
Under the present tort system, the enormous costs of litigation to
determine and apportion relative fault among asbestos companies,
0 7
Id, 447 A.2d at 549.
101. The court's rationale for imposing this unprecedented liability upon manu-
facturers for failure to warn of dangers which were undiscoverable at the time of
manufacture was that such a decision would advance the goals and policies of strict
liability. Id. at 205, 447 A.2d at 547. In actuality, the court was simply utilizing the
general purpose of strict liability-protecting consumers against harm from defective
products-to justify emasculating the requirement that the product be defective
before liability is imposed. See W. Platt & J. Platt, Movihg From Strict to "Absolute
Liabithty," Nat'l L.J., Jan. 17, 1983, at 15, col. 3.
102. But cf Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893
(1975) (stating in dicta that state-of-the-art defense may not be a defense in a warn-
ing case).
103. The court even pointed out that its decision would force the manufacturer
of a particular product to reflect in the price of the product the cost of insuring
against the possibility that the product will turn out to be defective. Beshada, at 206,
447 A.2d at 547.
Traditional tort law, recognizing that manufacturers are not insurers of their
products, states that liability should depend upon whether the manufacturer acted
reasonably in taking the action that the claimant alleges caused the harm. SENATE
REPORT, supra note 10, at 5-6. See also Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 Ill. 2d 26,
402 N.E.2d 194 (1980) (noting that holding a manufacturer liable for failure to warn
of a danger of which it would be impossible to know based on the present state of
knowledge would make the manufacturer the virtual insurer of its products).
104. At present, the effect that Beshada will have upon other types of product
liability cases is unclear. The Beshada court specifically declined to address the avail-
ability of the state-of-the-art defense in cases alleging theories other than strict liabil-
ity for failure to warn. Id. at 204 n.6, 447 A.2d at 546 n.6. However, the court noted
that there are strong conceptual similarities between warning and safety device cases,
which may make the reasoning of Beshada equally applicable to cases involving fail-
ure to include appropriate safety devices in products. Id., 447 A.2d at 546 n.6.
105. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980). For a discussion of Sindell, see notes 65-67 & 71-72 and accompanying text
supra.
106. 55 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1982). For a discussion
of Btchler, see notes 65-72 & 71-72 and accompanying text supra.
107. Manville Corp., the nation's largest asbestos producer, was spending some
$2 million per month for defense attorneys before it filed for reorganization under
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coupled with the volume of recoveries out of proportion to the vic-
tims' real losses,'0 8 are threatening defendants' financial ability to pay
future claimants. In contrast, a federal compensation system would
not be plagued by such problems. It would include federal contribu-
tion based upon the appropriate share of federal responsibility. The
rest of the funds in the federal compensation system would be derived
from assessing the asbestos industry in exchange for granting the in-
dustry immunity from further liability for occupational exposures to
asbestos. Victims of occupational exposure to asbestos would be enti-
tled to compensatory benefits without regard to fault. 10 9 Compensa-
tion for unreimbursed medical expenses and lost earnings'" 0 could be
administratively determined with sufficient speed to eliminate the
backlog of claims now pending in court, so that victims could receive
compensation while alive."'
On the other hand, these elements which a federally legislated
compensation system should include are much simpler to identify
than to apply. Past experience with federal compensation systems
such as the Black Lung Benefits Program" 12 and the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,'1 show that federal com-
pensation systems can themselves be unwieldy and unfair. The prin-
cipal problems have been how to isolate the true "victim" and
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act. Granelli, US Ltabih'tyfor Asbestos Grows,
Nat'l L.J., April 11, 1983, at 1, col. 3. For additional discussion of the enormous sums
asbestos manufacturers have had to pay because of asbestos-related litigation, see
note 93 and accompanying text supra.
108. As of 1982, the Manville Corp. alone had disbursed approximately $24
million for asbestos-related injury claims. Wall St. J., Aug. 30, 1982, at 3, col. 1.
109. By nature, a compensation system must operate according to no-fault prin-
ciples if it is to promptly and efficiently compensate injured persons. See TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at VII-204 to VII-205. The no-fault approach is ap-
propriate in the asbestos context because, inter aha, the great majority of asbestos
companies had no knowledge of the toxic nature of their products in the circum-
stances to which they exposed persons. See, e.g., Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods.
Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982) (medical profession was unaware until the
1960's that there was a potential health hazard from the use of insulation products
containing asbestos); Selikoff, supra note 52, at 23-24 (link between asbestos and lung
cancer not established until the 1960's).
110. There would be no compensation for pain and suffering. The various ra-
tionales justifying the award of damages for pain and suffering under the tort system
generally do not apply to a no-fault compensation program. TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 8, at VII-65 to VII-67.
111. See Hazards of Asbestos Exposure, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Com., Transp.,
and Tourism of the House Comm. on Energy and Com. 47, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982)
(statement of Dr. I. Selikoff) (by and large, very few workers receive compensation
while they are alive).
112. 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
113. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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efficiently provide him or her with adequate compensation.1 1 4  In-
deed, while not a major isolating factor, whether statutory categories
can be defined without being over-inclusive is of great practical im-
portance. All that we are suggesting is that the asbestos problem mer-
its careful and creative thinking regarding the utility and design of a
federal compensation system.' 15
Consumer product and environmental toxic torts do not at this
time present a compelling case for federal intervention. The four fac-
tors which may justify federal legislation are not so substantially im-
plicated in either consumer product or environmental toxic torts that
displacement of state remedies by a federal compensation system
should be considered a legitimate alternative.
V. CONCLUSION
Although tort law has been the traditional province of the states,
federal intervention may be justified under various circumstances. 1 6
Federal product liability tort reform is justified by the need to provide
some uniformity and certainty in product liability tort law." 7 The
present system has too disruptive an effect on interstate commerce. 18
At the same time, there are aspects of the toxic torts problem that
deserve exploration with respect to the possible need for a federal
compensation system. When, as in the problem of occupational expo-
sure to asbestos, a multiplicity of claims, 1 9 long latency periods
before the manifestation of harm, 20 difficulty in associating the vic-
tim's harm with a particular defendant, 121 and significant federal re-
sponsibility for the harm 122 combine to prevent the tort system from
properly functioning, Congress should consider the development of a
114. See Comment, supra note 34, at 191. As the Black Lung Benefits Act of
1972 has illustrated, legally created presumptions of disease often lead to compensat-
ing parties who do not deserve compensation. Id
115. See Aidfor Asbestos Vctlims, Wash. Post, Feb. 18, 1983, A20, col. 1.
116. See note 1 and accompanying text supra.
117. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at VII-28 to VII-29.
118. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
119. For a discussion of this factor in occupational toxic tort cases, see notes 45-
51 and accompanying text supra.
120. For a discussion of the long latency period between exposure to the toxic
substance and the manifestation of physical injury, see notes 52-55 and accompany-
ing text supra.
121. For a detailed discussion of the difficulty toxic tort plaintiffs have had
proving that a particular defendant caused their injury, see notes 56-71 and accom-
panying text supra.
122. For a discussion of the responsibility the federal government shares for the
harm suffered by victims of asbestos-related disease, see notes 72-88 and accompany-
ing text supra.
1114 [Vol. 28: p. 1088
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federal compensation system. Under these circumstances, federal in-
tervention may be necessary not only to resolve the particular toxic
tort problem at hand, but also to preserve the basic principles under-
lying the tort system itself.
28
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 6 [1983], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol28/iss6/3
